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WHAT’S IN A NAME?: A CASE FOR 
INCLUDING BIOMETRIC IDENTIFIERS ON 
ARREST WARRANTS 
Ryan Webb
Too often, innocent individuals sharing the same name and 
physical characteristics as the subject of an arrest warrant are 
misidentified and mistakenly held by law enforcement. The use of 
biometric identifiers, commonly known as fingerprint identification 
numbers, would help reduce the number of false arrests because a 
person’s fingerprints are entirely unique to that individual. Hearkening 
back to 1894, the Supreme Court’s prevailing interpretation of the 
particularity requirement of arrest warrants mandates only that the 
warrant include a subject’s name or general physical description. With 
such a low threshold to establish a facially valid warrant, law 
enforcement officers are essentially immunized from civil liability and 
mistakenly arrested individuals are without legal recourse. Such 
consequences do not accord with the Fourth Amendment’s “right of the 
people to be secure in their persons.” This Note argues that biometric 
identifiers, which have been used in law enforcement and have the 
ability to singularly identify the actual subject of an arrest warrant, 
should be included on arrest warrants. This embellishment of the 
“particularity” standard faithfully accords with the guarantees of the 
Fourth Amendment and would advance the rights of individuals who 
are wrongly arrested.
 J.D. Candidate, May 2014, Loyola Law School Los Angeles; B.A. Rhetoric and Political 
Economy, University of California, Berkeley, May 2009. Thank you to my parents for instilling 
in me a sense of justice, and to all the other Ryan Webbs for not having any outstanding arrest 
warrants.  
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Fourth Amendment guarantees the “right of the people to be 
secure in their persons”;1 however, when an individual possesses the 
same name or physical description as that listed on an arrest warrant 
issued for someone else, that right is no longer secure. In 1894, the 
Supreme Court of the United States explained the level of 
particularity required for describing the subject of an arrest warrant: 
the warrant must include the subject’s name, or if unknown, a 
description sufficiently identifying the subject.2 Since the Court set 
this standard, our population has grown from roughly 63 million 
citizens in 18943 to over 316 million citizens today,4 empirically 
increasing the probability that two individuals share the same name 
and physical description. 
From 2002 to 2009, the city of Denver, Colorado, recorded over 
five hundred cases of wrongful incarceration where law enforcement 
was armed with a legally valid arrest warrant but erred and arrested 
the wrong person.5 From 2006 to 2011, the Los Angeles Sheriff’s 
Department recorded more than 1,480 wrongful incarcerations, many 
of which were executed pursuant to a valid warrant.6 Despite being 
mistakenly arrested and detained for days and weeks on end,7 these 
individuals are often left with no viable path toward judicial relief.8
So long as the arresting officer executed a facially valid arrest 
warrant, courts will generally defer to the good-faith discretion of 
law enforcement and hold that a reasonable mistake immunizes the 
government agency from civil rights liability.9
 1. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 2. West v. Cabell, 153 U.S. 78, 85 (1894) (“[A] warrant for the arrest of a person charged 
with a crime must truly name him, or describe him sufficiently to identify him.”). 
 3. 1890 Fast Facts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/history
/www/through_the_decades/fast_facts/1890_fast_facts.html (last visited Oct. 18, 2012). 
 4. U.S. and World Population Clock, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/main 
/www/popclock.html (last visited Sept. 21, 2013). 
 5. Dan Frosch, Mistaken Identity Cases at Heart of Denver Lawsuit Over Wrongful Arrests,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2012, at A18. 
 6. Robert Faturechi & Jack Leonard, ID Errors Put Hundred In County Jail, L.A. TIMES,
Dec. 25, 2011, http://articles.latimes.com/2011/dec/25/local/la-me-wrong-id-20111225. 
 7. Id.
 8. See infra Parts III.A–B. 
 9. See infra Part III.A. 
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As these cases illustrate, many innocent individuals may share 
the same name and physical characteristics listed on a valid arrest 
warrant; however, no two individuals possess identical fingerprints.10
Historically, prisons similarly classified and identified arrestees 
solely by their names and physical measurements.11 After a Kansas 
federal prison discovered that two arrestees shared the same name 
and physical measurements,12 prisons across the country abolished 
the system and began using fingerprinting as the primary means of 
identification during an arrest.13 Today, federal and state law 
enforcement use fingerprint identification numbers (“biometric 
identifiers”) to classify and identify arrested individuals.14 Each time 
a person is booked and arrested, a unique biometric identifier is 
assigned to that individual, thereby distinguishing him or her from all 
other arrestees.15
Although the evolution from names and physical measurements 
toward biometric identifiers has proven to be an efficient and 
effective improvement on the process of classifying arrestees,16 the 
Supreme Court maintains that a name or physical description is 
sufficient to identify the subject of an arrest warrant.17 Until this 
standard is broadened to include biometric identifiers, innocent 
people will continue to be wrongfully incarcerated without any hope 
of judicial relief. 
 10. Biometric Authentication: What Method Works Best?, TECHNOVELGY.COM,
http://www.technovelgy.com/ct/technology-article.asp?artnum=16 (last visited Sept. 21, 2013). 
“In over 140 years of fingerprint comparison worldwide, no two fingerprints have ever been 
found to be alike, not even those of identical twins.” Id.
 11. See G. Larry Mays et al., Review Essay: DNA (Deoxyribonucleic Acid) Evidence, 
Criminal Law, and Felony Prosecution: Issues and Prospects, 16 JUST. SYS. J. 111, 112 (1992). 
The “Bertillon method” founded by the French police officer Alphonse Bertillon, involved 
measurements of an individual’s head and body, combined with photographs, physical 
descriptions, and other identifying marks, to create a catalogue for identifying multiple offenders. 
Id.
 12. History of Fingerprints, CRIME SCENE FORENSICS, LLC, http://www.crimescene 
-forensics.com/History_of_Fingerprints.html (last visited Sept. 21, 2013). 
 13. See Mays et al., supra note 11, at 112. 
 14. See infra Part III.C (discussing the FBI’s implementation of the Integrated Automated 
Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS)). 
 15. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SURVEY OF STATE CRIMINAL
HISTORY INFORMATION SYSTEMS, 2010, at viii (2011) [hereinafter DOJ SURVEY]. 
 16. Biometric Authentication: What Method Works Best?, supra note 10. 
 17. See West v. Cabell, 153 U.S. 78, 85 (1894). 
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Part II of this Note examines current arrest warrant procedure, 
traces evolving Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, and frames the 
warrant particularity issue through two recent federal court decisions 
regarding the use of biometric identifiers on arrest warrants. Part III 
first analyzes the existing paths toward judicial relief available to 
wrongfully incarcerated individuals, and then discusses the 
integration of fingerprinting and biometric identifiers in current 
federal and state law enforcement procedures. Part IV details the 
effects that the use of biometric identifiers would have on arrest 
warrant procedures and, ultimately, proposes that the Supreme Court 
interpret the Fourth Amendment’s warrant particularity requirement 
to include the use of numerical biometric identifiers capable of 
singularly identifying an arrest warrant’s actual subject on all 
existing and future arrest warrants. 
II. BACKGROUND
The Fourth Amendment explicitly requires that “no Warrants18
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and 
the persons or things to be seized.”19 Before an individual can be 
lawfully arrested through an arrest warrant pursuant to the Fourth 
Amendment, the warrant must be properly issued by a magistrate and 
properly executed by a peace officer of the state.20 Both the issuance 
and execution of the warrant are subject to separate determinations of 
probable cause.21 When individuals assert a violation of the Fourth 
Amendment Warrant Clause, they primarily rely on one of two 
distinct theories: that the warrant was not properly issued because it 
did not describe its subject with particularity, or that the warrant was 
 18. While the clause refers to both arrest and search warrants, this Note focuses solely on its 
application to arrest warrants. Unlike a search warrant, which gives authority to search an 
individual’s residence, an arrest warrant “command[s] the arrest of a designated person, such 
person to be brought before a court or magistrate to answer specified charges.” RONALD L.
CARLSON, CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROCEDURE § 2.1 (7th ed. 2005). 
 19. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 20. CARLSON, supra note 18, § 2.1. 
 21. See id.; THOMAS K. CLANCY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: ITS HISTORY AND 
INTERPRETATION §§ 12.2.1, 12.5.1 (2008). 
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not properly executed because the arresting officer lacked probable 
cause for the arrest.22
A.  Issuance and Execution of an Arrest Warrant 
To satisfy the probable cause requirement, a magistrate or 
judicial officer must issue the arrest warrant and can only do so upon 
a finding that probable cause justifies the arrest.23 In Henry v. United 
States,24 the Supreme Court observed that probable cause, as 
required for the issuance of an arrest warrant, can only exist “if the 
facts and circumstances known to the officer warrant a prudent man 
in believing that the offense has been committed.”25 Thus, to 
establish probable cause, the magistrate must examine the peace 
officer’s complaint, given under oath, and “carefully review any 
written application or affidavits supporting the request for an arrest 
warrant.”26 In this way, establishing probable cause largely depends 
on satisfaction of the Clause’s second requirement, that it be 
supported by “Oath or affirmation,” for a magistrate will not issue 
the warrant unless the officer affirms that the facts giving rise to the 
warrant’s necessity are true.27 Finally, for a warrant to be validly 
issued, it must satisfy the particularity requirement by including: (1) 
the defendant’s name or a description by which the defendant can be 
identified with reasonable certainty; (2) a description of the offense 
charged in the complaint; (3) a command that the defendant be 
arrested and brought without unnecessary delay before a magistrate 
judge or, if none is reasonably available, before a state or local 
judicial officer; and (4) a judge’s signature.28
 22. CLANCY, supra note 21, at §§ 12.2.2, 12.3.1. One can also argue that the officer’s 
affidavit submitted to the issuing magistrate lacked indicia of probable cause for proper issuance. 
These types of cases are rare. “[T]he only evidence admissible at [such a] hearing is the evidence 
submitted to the magistrate who issued the warrant” and, typically, great deference is given to the 
magistrate’s determination of probable cause. Id. §§ 12.3.1–12.3.2. 
 23. CARLSON, supra note 18, § 2.1. 
 24. 361 U.S. 98 (1959). 
 25. Id. at 102. 
 26. CARLSON, supra note 18, § 2.1; see also Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 481–
82 (1963) (“The arrest warrant procedure serves to insure that the deliberate, impartial judgment 
of a judicial officer will be interposed between the citizen and the police, to assess the weight and 
credibility of the information which the complaining officer adduces as probable cause.”). 
 27. CARLSON, supra note 18, § 2.1. 
 28. FED. R. CRIM. P. 4(b)(1)(a)–(d). 
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When executing the warrant, the arresting police officer need 
not have a copy of the warrant in his or her possession to make a 
valid arrest.29 For instance, when an officer conducts a traffic stop 
and runs a background check on the driver, the officer can access the 
Sheriff’s Data Network and other criminal databases through the 
patrol car laptop, or call a law enforcement agency and have an 
official convey the warrant’s description telephonically.30 The officer 
executing the warrant then must make an objective probable cause 
determination that the subject of the warrant matches the arrestee.31
The arresting officer’s determination should be based on the “totality 
of the circumstances” and whether there is a “reasonable belief” that 
the arrestee is, in fact, the person named in the warrant.32 This 
determination of probable cause at the time of execution and the 
particularity of the warrant’s description upon issuance provide 
courts the dual framework for assessing a violation of the Fourth 
Amendment’s warrant requirement.33
B.  Evolving Jurisprudence on the Fourth Amendment’s 
Warrant Particularity Requirement 
The Supreme Court first evaluated the scope of the Fourth 
Amendment’s particularity requirement in West v. Cabell.34 In West,
U.S. Marshall William Cabell arrested Vandy M. West on a charge 
of murder.35 The warrant under which West was arrested, however, 
named the subject as “James West” and did not contain any other 
description.36 Before trial, West requested that the jury be instructed 
that a warrant for the arrest of James West could not authorize his 
arrest even if he was the intended party because the warrant 
 29. NANCY YUENGER ET AL., CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW PROCEDURE AND PRACTICE
§ 4.7 (2012). 
 30. See New Mobile Computers in LA Sheriff’s Patrol Cars Increase Public Safety Through 
Advanced Technology, LACOUNTY.GOV, http://sheriff.lacounty.gov/wps/portal/lasd/media/detail 
/?current=true&urile=wcm:path:/lasd+content/lasd+site/home/home+top+stories/new+mobile+co
mputers+in+la+sheriffs+patrol+cars+increase+public+safety+through+advanced+technology 
(last visited Sept. 21, 2013). 
 31. YUENGER ET AL., supra note 29, § 4.5. 
 32. Hill v. Scott, 349 F.3d 1068, 1072–73 (8th Cir. 2003). 
 33. CLANCY, supra note 21, §§ 12.2.2, 12.3.1. 
 34. 153 U.S. 78 (1894). 
 35. Id. at 78. 
 36. Id. at 78–79. 
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incorrectly named the intended subject.37 The lower court disagreed 
and refused to grant West’s request.38
The Supreme Court subsequently overturned the lower court’s 
ruling and decided, “a warrant for the arrest of a person charged with 
a crime must truly name him, or describe him sufficiently to identify 
him.”39 Applying this standard, the Court then found the warrant to 
be defective because it contained neither West’s correct name nor a 
description of him.40 The Court’s interpretation of the Fourth 
Amendment’s particularity requirement, as set forth in West, remains 
the standard by which an arrest warrant is determined to be facially 
valid.41
Since West, the Court has refused to address the constitutionality 
of the particularity standard, focusing instead on the reasonableness 
of warrant execution and the existence of probable cause despite 
reasonable mistakes in matching the warrant to the arrestee.42
In Hill v. California,43 the Supreme Court granted certiorari to 
determine whether an arrest based on mistaken identity, but executed 
pursuant to a valid warrant, violated the Fourth Amendment.44 The 
case primarily revolved around an armed robbery that occurred in 
Studio City, California.45 The day after the robbery occurred, police 
officers arrested two men for possession of narcotics and, upon 
investigation of their car, found stolen property linking the men to 
the robbery.46 The two men told the officers the car belonged to 
Archie Hill and implicated Hill as one of the bank robbers.47
After checking Hill’s arrest record and verifying that his age and 
physical characteristics matched the descriptions given by the two 
 37. Id. at 80. 
 38. Id.
 39. Id. at 85. 
 40. Id. at 87–88. 
 41. See Rivera v. County of Los Angeles, No. CV 10-1861, 2011 WL 2650006, at *8–10 
(C.D. Cal. July 5, 2011). 
 42. See Cynthia Lee, Reasonableness with Teeth: The Future of Fourth Amendment 
Reasonableness Analysis, 81 MISS. L.J. 1133, 1147–48 (2012); Melanie Schoenfeld, 
Constitutional Amnesia: Judicial Validation of Probable Cause for Arresting the Wrong Person 
on a Facially Valid Warrant, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 1227, 1239–40, 1250–51 (2001). 
 43. 401 U.S. 797 (1971). 
 44. Id. at 802–05. 
 45. Id. at 797–98. 
 46. Id. at 798–99. 
 47. Id.
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men and the robbery victims, the officers went to Hill’s address.48
When the officers arrived at Hill’s residence, a man named Miller 
answered the door; he stated that he was not Hill and knew nothing 
about the stolen property.49 However, because Miller matched the 
physical description for Hill, the officers arrested Miller and seized 
the stolen property they found in the home incident to Miller’s 
arrest.50
Hill was subsequently arrested and charged with robbery.51 At 
the preliminary hearing before Hill’s trial, Hill argued that Miller’s 
arrest was invalid under the Fourth Amendment and that any 
property seized during the arrest could not legally be used as 
evidence against Hill.52 The trial judge sustained the admissibility of 
the evidence, finding that “the arresting officers had acted in the 
good-faith belief that Miller was in fact Hill.”53 The Supreme Court 
granted certiorari and upheld the validity of both Miller’s arrest and 
the subsequent search of Hill’s home.54 The Court held that as long 
as the police have probable cause to arrest one person, the 
subsequent arrest of the wrong person based on a reasonable mistake 
in identifying the subject is constitutionally valid.55 The Court 
clarified that “sufficient probability, not certainty, is the touchstone 
of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment.”56
Numerous lower courts have since expanded the notion of 
“reasonableness” in similar cases of mistaken identity arrests based 
on a facially valid warrant.57 In Hill v. Scott,58 Brian Arthur Hill, an 
 48. Id. at 799. 
 49. Id.
 50. Id. at 797, 801–03. The police did not have an arrest or search warrant for Hill or his 
apartment. Id. A search incident to an arrest includes the right to search the arrestee’s near 
vicinity and is justified by the general right to seize items connected with a crime. See CARLSON,
supra note 18, § 2.2. 
 51. Hill v. California, 401 U.S. at 799–802. 
 52. Id. at 801–02. 
 53. Id. at 801. 
 54. Id.
 55. Id. at 802. 
 56. Id. at 804. 
 57. See Brown v. Patterson, 823 F.2d 167, 169 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding an officer was 
reasonable to arrest § 1983 plaintiff with the same name and race, but otherwise different 
information, as was listed on the warrant); Johnson v. Miller, 680 F.2d 39, 41–42 (7th Cir. 1982) 
(concluding police officer’s misidentification arrest of a white woman pursuant to an arrest 
warrant for a black woman did not violate the Constitution). 
 58. 349 F.3d 1068 (8th Cir. 2003). 
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African-American, was arrested under a warrant issued for a 
different Brian Hill, even though the warrant specified a different 
middle name, birth date, and eye color.59 Before his arrest, Hill 
called the police to report his disabled parking permit had been 
stolen.60 Three officers arrived on the scene, and Officer Scott, who 
recognized Hill,61 called and asked a dispatcher to conduct a warrant 
check on a “Brian Hill.”62 The dispatcher replied that there was an 
outstanding warrant issued for a “Brian Walter Hill . . . who was 
5’11” and 175 pounds with green eyes.”63 Believing the warrant was 
for the Hill he recognized, Officer Scott told the other officers to 
execute the warrant.64 When Hill protested that he was not the person 
on the warrant, a confrontation arose between Hill and the arresting 
officers, which required Hill to be immediately hospitalized.65
Despite Hill’s insistence that Officer Scott should have investigated 
his middle name, date of birth, and eye color before executing the 
arrest, the court nonetheless held that Hill could not assert a violation 
of his Fourth Amendment rights.66 Once the court determined the 
warrant was facially valid, it held that “[Officer] Scott had sufficient 
consistent identifying information to reasonably conclude the 
warrant was for appellant Hill and no reasonable officer would have 
known failing to investigate further would violate the Fourth 
Amendment.”67
While the court acknowledged that further investigation would 
have confirmed Brian Hill was innocent,68 it was bound by Hill v. 
California’s holding that a “mistaken arrest based on a facially valid 
warrant does not violate the Fourth Amendment if the officers 
reasonably mistook the arrestee for the person named in the 
warrant.”69 Thus, as Hill v. Scott shows, even where height, weight, 
 59. Id. at 1072. 
 60. Id. at 1070. 
 61. In 1995, Hill sued Officer Scott and other officers for wrongful arrest and excessive 
force, and defendants settled on the eve of trial. The events at issue in this case occurred less than 
a year after the settlement. Id.
 62. Id.
 63. Id.
 64. Id. at 1071. 
 65. Id. at 1070–71. 
 66. Id. at 1074. 
 67. Id.
 68. Id. at 1073–74. 
 69. See id. at 1072. 
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and eye color differ, the court will defer to the officer’s good-faith 
determination of probable cause.70
As courts like the one in Hill v. Scott continue to broaden the 
standard of reasonableness by which an officer may obtain probable 
cause to execute an arrest warrant against an innocent individual,71
other lower courts have questioned whether a name or physical 
description remains the most reasonable form of warrant 
identification in light of the growing number of wrongful 
incarcerations.72
C.  Biometric Identifiers and the Fourth Amendment’s 
Particularity Requirement 
The following California federal district court cases involve two 
of the more than 1,480 wrongful incarcerations that took place in Los 
Angeles, California, from 2006 to 2011.73 In both cases, the arrest 
warrants satisfied the particularity standard set down in West, but 
failed to include biometric identifiers readily available to Los 
Angeles law enforcement officials.74
1. Rivera v. County of Los Angeles75
On July 12, 1985, a Los Angeles Superior Court issued an arrest 
warrant for an individual named Santiago Rivera on charges of 
felony manslaughter and violations of California Vehicle Code 
sections 23153(a) and 23153(b).76 The warrant contained the name 
“Santiago Rivera,” a birth date, and a description that the subject was 
a Hispanic male with brown hair, brown eyes, a height of five feet 
five inches, and a weight of 180 pounds.77 On June 18, 1989, 
Montclair police arrested a Santiago Iberra Rivera (“Rivera”) on the 
mistaken belief that he was the warrant’s actual subject.78 Although 
 70. See id. at 1073–74. 
 71. See id. at 1075–76 (Heaney, J., dissenting); see Lee, supra note 42, at 1142–43. 
 72. See infra Part II.C. 
 73. Smith v. County of Los Angeles, No. CV 11-10666 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 11, 2012); Rivera v. 
County of Los Angeles, No. CV 10-1861, 2011 WL 2650006 (C.D. Cal. July 5, 2011); Faturechi 
& Leonard, supra note 6. 
 74. Smith, No. CV 11-10666, slip op. at 4, 12; Rivera, 2011 WL 2650006, at *6, *8–10, *13. 
 75. No. CV 10-1861, 2011 WL 2650006 (C.D. Cal. July 5, 2011). 
 76. Id. at *2; CAL. VEH. CODE § 25153(a)–(b) (West 2013) (criminalizing driving under the 
influence and causing injury). 
 77. Rivera, 2011 WL 2650006, at *3. 
 78. Id. at *2. 
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this Rivera was one inch taller and ten pounds lighter than the 
warrant’s description stated,79 the arresting officers maintained that 
this Rivera matched the description and proceeded to book him in the 
San Bernardino detention center.80 Rivera was not released until nine 
days later when a fingerprint comparison revealed that he was not the 
actual subject.81 Without making any changes to the warrant’s 
description, the police reissued the warrant just a few days following 
Rivera’s release.82
Then on March 7, 2009, almost twenty years after his wrongful 
arrest, Rivera was riding in a car in San Bernardino, California, when 
police stopped the vehicle for missing a license plate.83 An officer 
ran a record check against Rivera’s name and pulled up the arrest 
warrant for the other Santiago Rivera.84 Despite Rivera’s protests 
that he was mistakenly arrested on the same warrant twenty years 
earlier, Rivera was booked in the local detention center for two days, 
and then transferred to the Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department.85 Due 
to the seriousness of the charges in the warrant and the court’s 
inability to locate the fingerprint file of the true subject, Rivera 
remained in custody for thirty-three days until a fingerprint 
comparison revealed he was not the actual subject.86
Following his second faulty arrest, Rivera brought suit against 
Los Angeles and San Bernardino Counties asserting civil rights 
claims under § 1983 for violation of his Fourth and Fourteenth 
Amendment rights.87 Rivera claimed that in both incidents, the 
warrant did not satisfy the Fourth Amendment’s particularity 
requirement.88 Specifically, he argued that his Fourth Amendment 
rights were violated because the warrant failed to contain the actual 
subject’s biometric identification number when it was originally 
issued in 1985 and subsequently failed to include either his or the 
actual suspect’s biometric identification number upon the warrant’s 
 79. Id. at *3, *8–9. 
 80. Id. at *2. 
 81. Id.
 82. See id.
 83. Id. at *3. 
 84. Id.
 85. Id. at *34. 
 86. Id. at *4. 
 87. Id. at *1. 
 88. Id. at *1, *6. 
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reissuance in 1989.89 The court cited West and held not only that the 
descriptions in both warrants contained more information than 
legally required, but that both sets of arresting officers were 
reasonable in their beliefs that Rivera was the intended subject of the 
warrants.90
2. Smith v. County of Los Angeles91
In 1991, the Los Angeles Municipal Court92 issued a felony 
arrest warrant for a Reggie Lamar Smith for failing to appear for 
sentencing on a felony sexual battery charge.93 Although law 
enforcement had the suspect’s fingerprint identification numbers at 
the time the warrant was issued,94 the warrant only identified the 
suspect by first and last name, date of birth, ethnicity, sex, height, 
weight, eye color, and hair color.95
On July 25, 2007, Reginald Lenard Smith (“Smith”) was pulled 
over for a traffic violation in Antioch, Tennessee.96 The arresting 
officer searched his name and discovered the 1991 warrant, which 
matched Smith’s information and description.97 Smith was 
subsequently arrested and extradited to California where he was 
incarcerated for thirteen days.98 After his release, the Los Angeles 
Superior Court reissued the warrant with the same name and 
description and without any information clearing Smith as the 
intended subject.99 Four years later, on January 27, 2011, Smith was 
arrested again on the belief he was the Reggie Lamar Smith 
described in the warrant.100
 89. Id. at *6. 
 90. Id. at *8–10. 
 91. No. CV 11-10666 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 11, 2012). 
 92. On January 22, 2000, the Judges of the Municipal and Superior Courts voted to merge 
into the Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles. Historical Perspective, LOS 
ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT
http://www.lasuperiorcourt.orghttp://www.lasuperiorcourt.orghttp://www.lasuperiorcourt.org/abo
utcourt/ui/history.aspx (last visited Sept. 21, 2013). 
 93. Smith, No. CV 11-10666, slip op. at 4. 
 94. Id.
 95. Id.
 96. Id.
 97. Id.
 98. Id. The basis for his release is unclear. The case simply states “the Superior Court 
ordered [Smith’s] release from jail on the basis that he was not the subject of the warrant.” Id.
 99. Id.
 100. Id.
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After both of his arrests, in 2007 and 2011, Smith brought civil 
rights claims against the county of Los Angeles for violations of his 
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.101 Regarding his second 
arrest, Smith argued that the warrant did not meet the particularity 
requirement by failing to contain the true suspect’s biometric 
identifier, Smith’s biometric identifier, or a statement exonerating 
Smith as the intended subject.102 Responding to the County’s motion 
to dismiss, the court dismissed Smith’s Fourth Amendment claim 
with prejudice.103 In reaching its decision, the court explained: 
In short, the Fourth Amendment does not require additional 
information regarding the subject of an arrest warrant when 
the warrant correctly names the subject. Only when “the 
authorities do not know, or are uncertain of the intended 
arrestee’s name” must officers “give[] some other 
description of the intended arrestee that is sufficient to 
identify him.”104
However, contrary to its holding, the court acknowledged a 
deficiency in the law stating: 
It appears clear that requiring the use of biometric 
identifiers would not be at all burdensome and would 
provide a more precise description of the person sought 
than traditional identifiers. However, controlling 
jurisprudence, which this Court is . . . bound to follow, does 
not require the use of biometric identifiers regardless of 
burden.105
III. ANALYSIS
The wrongful incarcerations of Santiago Rivera, Reginald 
Smith, and thousands of others106 clearly demonstrate the need for 
broadening the particularity standard in West to include biometric 
 101. Id. at 4–5, 10 (referring to Gant v. County of Los Angeles, No. CV 08-05756, 2011 WL 
1585133 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 8, 2009) where Smith was a plaintiff and the court dismissed all of 
Smith’s claims). 
 102. Id. at 4–5. 
 103. Id. at 12. 
 104. Id. at 11–12 (citations omitted) (quoting Gant, 2011 WL 1585133, at *17 (quoting Powe 
v. City of Chicago, 664 F.2d 639, 647 (7th Cir. 1981))). 
 105. Id. at 12. 
 106. See Frosch, supra note 5; see Faturechi & Leonard, supra note 6. 
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identifiers. Without such a change, the rights of mistakenly arrested 
individuals to some form of relief will continue to be curbed by the 
entrenched judicial deference to the discretion of law enforcement in 
civil rights cases. 
A.  The Presumption of Qualified Immunity in 
Determining Probable Cause 
As the precedent above shows, asserting a violation of the 
Fourth Amendment’s Warrant Clause must rest on a theory either 
that the warrant was invalid or that the arresting officer lacked 
probable cause.107 Thus, individuals mistakenly arrested on a warrant 
that is valid under West must argue that the arresting officer lacked 
probable cause for arrest.108
In situations where an officer wrongfully arrests an individual 
pursuant to a facially valid warrant, the law enforcement agency is 
entitled to a defense of qualified immunity.109 The Supreme Court of 
the United States defined the modern test for qualified immunity in 
Harlow v. Fitzgerald.110 In Harlow, the Court determined, 
“government officials performing discretionary functions generally 
are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct 
does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights 
of which a reasonable person would have known.”111 In the context 
of wrongful incarceration, federal courts have interpreted Harlow to 
mean that “a mistaken arrest based on a facially valid warrant does 
not violate the Fourth Amendment if the officers reasonably mistook 
the arrestee for the person named in the warrant.”112 Hill v. Scott
demonstrates that an arresting officer need not investigate any further 
once some reasonable basis for arrest exists at the time of the 
warrant’s execution.113 In fact, some courts seem willing to accept 
 107. See supra Part II.B. 
 108. Id.
 109. Hill v. Scott, 349 F.3d 1068, 1071–72 (8th Cir. 2003). 
 110. 457 U.S. 800 (1982). 
 111. Id. at 818. 
 112. Luke Klinker, Hill v. Scott: The Eighth Circuit Upholds the Basic Principles of the 
Objective Reasonableness Standard in a Case of Mistaken Identity Arrest, 38 CREIGHTON L.
REV. 691, 691 (2004–2005). 
 113. See Scott, 349 F.3d at 1072–73. Despite the fact that Hill was an African American and 
the warrant described the subject as having green eyes, “the first and last names were identical, 
the two Brian Hills [were] only two years apart in age, and there was only one inch difference in 
height and twenty-five pounds difference in weight.” Id. at 1072. 
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the officer’s good-faith reliance on the validity of the warrant alone 
as a bar to recovery.114 Ultimately, as long as the arresting officer 
was not presented with contradictory information before making the 
arrest, a court will find a sufficient basis for probable cause and bar 
recovery under the Fourth Amendment.115
B.  Turning to the Fourteenth Amendment for Relief 
Given the difficulty of obtaining relief under the Fourth 
Amendment, victims of mistaken identity arrests will often also 
assert civil rights violations of their Fourteenth Amendment due 
process rights116 under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.117 The Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause protects individuals against 
deprivations of liberty without due process of law.118 It is widely 
held “that an individual has a liberty interest in being free from 
incarceration absent a criminal conviction.”119 To bring a § 1983 
cause of action against a state or municipal officer, the plaintiff 
must establish that (1) he was “deprived of his 
constitutional rights by defendants and their employees 
acting under color of state law;” (2) that the defendants 
have customs or policies which “amount[] to deliberate 
indifference” to their constitutional rights; and (3) that these 
policies are the “moving force behind the constitutional 
violation[s].”120
 114. Wise v. City of Philadelphia, No. CIV. A. 97-2651, 1998 WL 464918, at *2–3 (E.D. Pa. 
July 31, 1998) (finding that the arresting officers reasonably relied on an invalid bench warrant); 
St. Fort v. Grinnel, No. 95-C-2295, 1995 WL 632274, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 26, 1995) (“An officer 
acting upon a facially valid warrant possesses probable cause to arrest.”). 
 115. See Scott, 349 F.3d at 1072. 
 116. See Smith v. County of Los Angeles, No. CV 11-10666, slip op. at 7–9 (C.D. Cal. 
Sept. 11, 2012); Rivera v. County of Los Angeles, No. CV 10-1861, 2011 WL 2650006, at *10–
17 (C.D. Cal. July 5, 2011). 
 117. The Supreme Court has stated that “section [1983] is not itself a source of substantive 
rights, but a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred by those parts of the 
United States Constitution and federal statutes that it describes.” Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 
137, 144 n.3 (1979). 
 118. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
 119. Rivera, 2011 WL 2650006, at *9. 
 120. Id. at *6 (quoting Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 681–82 (9th Cir. 2001)); see 
also 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) (stating that any citizen deprived of his or her rights by a state or 
municipal officer acting under color of statute, ordinance or custom may seek redress in a civil 
action).
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In Rivera, plaintiff Rivera asserted § 1983 due process violations 
resting on two different theories.121 Rivera first claimed that 
defendants deprived him of due process by detaining him in spite of 
readily available information that he was not the intended subject.122
Rivera then claimed that defendants deprived him of due process by 
failing to update the warrant database to reflect that he had been 
cleared as the warrant’s subject following his first arrest.123
The court, relying on Baker v. McCollan124 and Lee v. City of 
Los Angeles,125 framed Rivera’s first argument to be an issue of 
whether the Los Angeles County defendants “were constitutionally 
obligated to go beyond the paperwork . . . and independently verify 
that Plaintiff was, in fact, the subject of the warrant.”126 The court 
rejected this argument, reiterating what it believed to be a common-
sense principle: that “a jailer should not be expected to go behind a 
court order of commitment to determine whether a person presented 
for safekeeping has been convicted as a result of some denial of his 
constitutional rights.”127
 121. Rivera asserted an additional theory that his Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated 
because defendant Los Angeles County failed to independently verify his identity. Rivera, 2011 
WL 2650006, at *10, *14–15. This theory is not addressed in the opinion because the Court’s 
ruling relied on the same rationale as its ruling on Rivera’s first argument: that Defendants were 
not required to independently investigate Rivera’s identity or Rivera’s innocence. See id. at *12, 
*14–15. 
 122. Id. at *11–13. 
 123. Id. at *13–14. 
 124. 443 U.S. 137 (1979). Baker involved a situation where an arrest warrant was issued 
against the wanted subject’s brother after the subject furnished a duplicate of his brother’s 
identification during a prior arrest. Id. at 140–41. When local police attempted to execute the 
warrant, they arrested the wrong brother, who, in spite of repeated protests of innocence, was 
detained in county jail for three days before the discrepancy was discovered. Id. at 141. In 
determining whether he was deprived of due process, the Court noted that “depending on what 
procedures the State affords defendants following arrest and prior to actual trial, mere detention 
pursuant to a valid warrant but in the face of repeated protests of innocence will after the lapse of 
a certain amount of time deprive the accused of liberty . . . without due process of law.” Id. at 
145–46. Nonetheless, the court held that “a sheriff executing an arrest warrant is [not] required by 
the Constitution to investigate independently every claim of innocence,” and found the three-day 
detention did not amount to a deprivation without due process of law. Id.
 125. 250 F.3d 668 (9th Cir. 2001). “A detainee’s loss of liberty gives rise to a due process 
claim under Baker at the point when detaining officials know or should know that the detainee is 
entitled to release.” Rivera, 2011 WL 2650006, at *11. 
 126. Rivera, 2011 WL 2650006, at *10–11. 
 127. Id. at *12 (quoting Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v. Rhodes, 403 F.2d 2, 7 (10th Cir. 
1968)).
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Rivera’s second argument asserted that defendants should have 
updated the warrant database with information clearing him as the 
subject following his first arrest, and that the failure to do so was a 
violation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights.128 To determine 
whether due process requires a governmental entity to engage in such 
a procedure, the court applied the three-part balancing test129
established in Mathews v. Eldridge.130 The court balanced the risk of 
error in light of Rivera’s interest against the government’s interest 
and found that “the Due Process Clause does require a custodial 
agency to update a re-issued warrant to include information 
regarding an individual’s exoneration on the basis of mistaken 
identity.”131
Nonetheless, the court concluded that Rivera could not prevail 
on his second due process claim for failure to satisfy the second and 
third prongs of the § 1983 statute.132 Specifically, the court found 
that Rivera did not present evidence that the failure to update the 
warrant database was a custom or practice of “deliberate 
indifference,” relying on the argument that “a single constitutional 
deprivation ordinarily is insufficient to establish a longstanding 
practice or custom.”133
As Rivera illustrates, recovery under the Fourteenth Amendment 
requires not only proof of a due process violation, but also a showing 
that the government agency’s behavior is the result of a custom of 
“deliberate indifference.”134 Yet, applying a “deliberate indifference” 
standard imposes a level of subjectivity that makes it nearly 
 128. Id. at *13. 
 129. The test requires that the court balance: (1) the private interest affected by the official 
action; (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation and the probable value of additional safeguards; and 
(3) the governmental interest, including the fiscal and administrative burdens of additional 
procedures. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976). 
 130. 424 U.S. 319. 
 131. Rivera, 2011 WL 2650006, at *13 (finding that the relatively uncommon nature of the 
case made the risk of error slight, and that Rivera’s interest in being free from incarceration 
outweighed the government’s burden to update its database when an individual is exonerated on 
the basis of mistaken identity). 
 132. The second and third prongs state that the plaintiff must prove that “the governmental 
entity has customs or policies which amount to a deliberate indifference to constitutional rights,” 
and that these “policies are the moving force behind the constitutional violations.” Id. at *14. 
 133. Id. at *14 (citing Christie v. Iopa, 176 F.3d 1231, 1235 (9th Cir. 1999)). 
 134. Id.
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impossible to obtain relief under § 1983.135 Under this standard, 
wrongfully incarcerated individuals must not only obtain records 
from a government database to prove custom, but also prove that the 
agency subjectively chose to ignore their due process rights.136 Thus, 
individuals mistakenly arrested and detained pursuant to a valid 
warrant are faced with a high probability of no relief.137
C.  Fingerprint Technology and Biometric Identifiers 
Given the difficulty for mistaken identity victims to obtain relief 
pursuant to a Fourth or Fourteenth Amendment violation, revising 
the particularity standard to include biometric identifiers presents an 
alternative remedy. 
1.  Integration of Fingerprinting in Law Enforcement 
In 1903, a federal prison in Leavenworth, Kansas, helped change 
the way the American criminal justice system classifies and 
identifies arrested individuals.138 Prior to 1903, prisons classified 
arrestees using Bertillon measurements139 and numerical 
measurements of a person’s face and body parts.140 When a man 
named Will West was arrested and booked into the Leavenworth 
prison system, prison officials photographed his face and took his 
Bertillon measurements.141 Upon completion of the booking, 
officials discovered that another inmate, William West, had the same 
Bertillon measurements and bore a striking resemblance to Will 
West.142 The incident called into question the reliability of Bertillon 
measurements and ultimately led Leavenworth to become the first 
 135. See DeAnna Pratt Swearingen, Innocent Until Arrested?: Deliberate Indifference 
Toward Detainees’ Due Process Rights, 62 ARK. L. REV. 101, 117–19 (2009). 
 136. See id.
 137. See Schoenfeld, supra note 42, at 1250–51. 
 138. Fingerprinting has been embedded in the criminal justice system for over 100 years and 
has never failed as a means of personal identification. History of Fingerprints, supra note 12. “No 
two fingerprints have ever been found to be alike, not even those of identical twins.” Biometric 
Authentication: What Method Works Best?, supra note 10. 
 139. History of Fingerprints, supra note 12. 
 140. Bertillon System of Criminal Identification, NAT’L L. ENFORCEMENT MUSEUM INSIDER,
http://www.nleomf.org/museum/news/newsletters/online-insider/november-2011/bertillon-
system-criminal-identification.html (last visited Sept. 21, 2013). 
 141. History of Fingerprints, supra note 12. 
 142. Id.
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American penitentiary system to install a fingerprint system in 
1904.143
Shortly after Leavenworth, the Second Circuit examined the 
need for an improved identification system in United States v. 
Kelly,144 a case deciding whether fingerprinting should become a 
routine part of the New York state booking process.145 The court 
ruled to adopt fingerprinting, finding “no ground in reason or 
authority for interfering with a method of identifying persons 
charged with crime which has now become widely known. . . .”146
2.  Fingerprints in the Digital Era 
Just a few years ago, completing an arrestee’s fingerprint check 
could take up to three months, “because fingerprint cards had to be 
physically transported and processed.”147 However in 1999, the FBI 
implemented the Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification 
System (IAFIS),148 an automated system for searching fingerprint 
files, capable of “distinguish[ing] a single fingerprint from thousands 
or even millions of fingerprints previously scanned and stored in 
digital form in the computer’s memory.”149 IAFIS maintains the 
largest biometric database in the world,150 containing fingerprints, 
criminal history files, and associated mug shots for more than 
seventy million subjects.151 IAFIS also allows for the interstate 
exchange of this information though the Interstate Identification 
 143. MITCHEL P. ROTH, PRISONS AND PRISON SYSTEMS: A GLOBAL ENCYCLOPEDIA 159 
(Greenwood Press, 2006). 
 144. 55 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1932). 
 145. Id. at 67, 70. 
 146. Id. at 68. The Second Circuit reversed the district court’s finding that the State lacked 
statutory authority to integrate fingerprinting into the booking process. Id. The Court noted that 
fingerprinting was “a very certain means [of identification] . . . especially important in a time 
when increased population and vast aggregations of people in urban centers have rendered the 
notoriety of the individual in the community no longer a ready means of identification.” Id. at 69. 
 147. All About Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS),
POLICEONE.COM, http://www.policeone.com/police-products/investigation/afis/articles/1802754 
-All-About-Integrated-Automated-Fingerprint-Identification-System-IAFIS/ (last visited Sept. 21, 
2013).
 148. Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System, FBI.GOV, http://www.fbi.gov 
/about-us/cjis/fingerprints_biometrics/iafis/iafis (last visited Sept. 21, 2013). 
 149. DOJ SURVEY, supra note 15, at v. 
 150. See Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System, supra note 148 (stating that 
IAFIS is the largest biometric database in the world). 
 151. Id.
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Index (III).152 As of December 2010, all fifty states and the District 
of Columbia participated in III and had access to every other state’s 
criminal history files.153
After a set of fingerprints is entered into IAFIS, a biometric 
identification number is assigned, matching the individual to his or 
her fingerprints.154 Law enforcement agencies primarily use two 
identifiers: a State Identification (SID) number, assigned to every 
individual booked into a state jail, and an FBI number, assigned to all 
persons arrested for a felony in any state.155
Once an individual is arrested and booked into county jail, the 
law enforcement agency will fingerprint and photograph the 
individual.156 Forty-two states, including California, take fingerprints 
using “livescan” technology, which captures an electronic image of 
the arrestee’s fingerprints.157 In California, for example, the image is 
transmitted to the California Department of Justice (CDOJ), and 
within a few minutes, the CDOJ responds with the arrestee’s SID 
and/or FBI number and criminal history.158 If there is no match, the 
CDOJ assigns new SID and FBI numbers for the arrestee.159
Given the prevalence of fingerprint technology and nationwide 
access to IAFIS, many argue that the use of FBI and SID numbers is 
the most efficient and effective form of positively identifying an 
individual with a criminal history.160 Entering a SID or FBI number 
into III pulls up all identifying information linked to that individual, 
including his or her name, birth date, race, sex, criminal history, and 
associated mug shot.161 Furthermore, patrol cars are gradually being 
 152. DOJ SURVEY, supra note 15, at v. 
 153. Id. at vi. 
 154. Id.
 155. Smith v. County of Los Angeles, No. CV 11-10666, slip op. at 2 (C.D. Cal. Sep. 11, 
2012).
 156. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 12.80.060 (1962); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1750 (2004); 
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 29-11 (2003); GA. CODE ANN. § 35-3-4 (2000); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 67-
3004 (2001); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 148-76 (2003); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-390 (2004); W. VA.
CODE § 15-2-24 (2004). 
 157. Smith, No. CV 11-10666, slip. op. at 2; DOJ SURVEY, supra note 15, at 7. 
 158. Smith, No. CV 11-10666, slip. op. at 2. 
 159. Id.
 160. See Corey Preston, Faulty Foundations: How the False Analogy to Routine 
Fingerprinting Undermines the Argument for Arrestee DNA Sampling, 19 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 475, 485–86 (2010) (arguing that DNA testing would be an inferior method for criminal 
identification purposes than current methods of fingerprinting through IAFIS). 
 161. Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System, supra note 148. 
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outfitted with computer systems linked to IAFIS and III, allowing 
deputies to run background checks and pull up a suspect’s mug shot 
in a matter of seconds during a patrol stop.162 As federal and state 
law enforcement continue to find ways to integrate fingerprint 
technology to apprehend criminals, they have yet to effectively apply 
it to the prevention of wrongful incarcerations. 
IV. PROPOSAL
As a framework for its proposal, this Note attempts to trace two 
evolutions: the evolution of the Fourth Amendment’s warrant 
requirement and the evolution of fingerprinting into the American 
criminal justice system. At each stage, the need to adapt became 
apparent, for the status quo was no longer seen as the most 
reasonable method of operation toward the efficient resolution of 
justice. This Note suggests that the criminal justice system is at yet 
another stage, where the use of names and physical descriptions on 
arrest warrants can no longer be viewed as the most reasonable 
method of identifying an arrest warrant’s subject. 
A.  Protecting a Constitutional Right 
As cases like Rivera and Smith illustrate, the out-of-date 
standard set forth in West simply creates the unacceptable risk of 
infringing on innocent people’s liberties and leaving them with no 
relief. If an arrest warrant contains either a correct name or sufficient 
physical description of the actual subject, police officers may 
properly execute the warrant but wrongfully arrest an innocent 
person, and still have probable cause under the Fourth 
Amendment.163 Moreover, even when such victims are subsequently 
detained and denied due process, the Fourteenth Amendment bars 
relief unless the law enforcement agency has reason to know the 
 162. W.J. Hennigan, Sheriff’s Deputies to Get Battlefield-Tested Technology, L.A. TIMES,
Nov. 25, 2011, http://articles.latimes.com/2011/nov/25/business/la-fi-raytheon-sheriff-20111125. 
 163. See Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797, 802–04 (1971); Hill v. Scott, 349 F.3d 1068, 1074 
(8th Cir. 2003); Brown v. Patterson, 823 F.2d 167, 169 (7th Cir. 1987); Johnson v. Miller, 680 
F.2d 39, 42 (7th Cir. 1982). 
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individual is being wrongfully detained164 or engages in a custom of 
deliberate indifference toward the detainee’s due process rights.165
The arrest of an innocent person also has serious consequences 
from a systemic perspective and can jeopardize the safety of society. 
When mistaken identity victims are arrested and detained, the 
warrant is deactivated and the actual subject remains at large.166 As a 
result, all law enforcement agencies are notified that the warrant has 
been executed and are erroneously led to presume that the suspect 
named in the warrant has been apprehended, thereby discontinuing 
any efforts to arrest the guilty person.167 Because arresting officers 
are under no duty to investigate claims of innocence once the warrant 
is executed,168 the actual subject remains free until the error is 
eventually discovered.169
B.  A Minimal Burden 
Given the substantial investment and nationwide 
synchronization of the use of biometric identifiers in the last 
decade,170 the burden on law enforcement agencies to name the 
subject of an arrest warrant by biometric identifiers and on 
magistrates to issue the arrest warrant with such identifiers is 
minimal. Any individual who has been arrested and booked has also 
been fingerprinted and assigned a SID and/or FBI biometric 
identifier.171 Thus, law enforcement agencies across the country can 
access III, run the name through IAFIS, and determine whether the 
subject of the arrest warrant has a SID or FBI number to be included 
on the warrant. 
Inevitably there will be some subjects with no criminal history 
and thus no assigned biometric identifier. In the event that an 
 164. See Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 145–46 (1979); Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 
F.3d 668, 683 (9th Cir. 2001); Rivera v. County of Los Angeles, No. CV 10-1861, 2011 WL 
2650006, at *11 (C.D. Cal. July 5, 2011). 
 165. See Lee, 250 F.3d at 681–82; Rivera, 2011 WL 2650006, at *14. 
 166. Steve Rothlein, Mistaken Identity Warrant Arrests, LEGAL & LIABILITY RISK MGMT.
INST., http://www.llrmi.com/articles/legal_update/mistaken_identity_arrests.shtml (last visited 
Sept. 21, 2013). 
 167. Id.
 168. See Baker, 443 U.S. at 145–46; Lee, 250 F.3d at 683; Rivera, 2011 WL 2650006, at *11. 
 169. Rothlein, supra note 166. 
 170. Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System, supra note 148. 
 171. Smith v. County of Los Angeles, No. CV 11-10666, slip. op. at 2 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 11, 
2012).
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individual is wrongfully arrested on a warrant without a biometric 
identifier, law enforcement agencies should be required, as they 
would for any reissued warrant following a wrongful arrest, to 
reissue the warrant with the wrongfully arrested individual’s 
biometric identifier, indicating that that individual has been 
exonerated. Then, any officer executing the warrant would know to 
run the exonerated individual’s biometric identifier in the warrant 
database and similarly match that identifying information against the 
arrestee’s before making an arrest. 
C.  Executing the Warrant and Determining Probable Cause 
Practically speaking, the use of biometric identifiers would place 
a greater responsibility on law enforcement officials executing an 
arrest warrant. No longer could an officer simply match the name on 
the warrant to the name of the arrestee and obtain probable cause to 
arrest. The inclusion of biometric identifiers would require the 
officer to look up the biometric identification number in the warrant 
database, examine the person’s profile and identifying information, 
and only then make a determination that the arrestee is, in fact, the 
person described in the warrant. If the officer’s patrol car is outfitted 
with a police computer, the biometric identifier would pull up the 
associated mug shot of the actual subject, as well.172
Requiring the use of biometric identifiers would also 
systemically create a uniform standard for executing arrest warrants 
and better equip courts to engage in a Fourth Amendment probable 
cause analysis. Too often, courts are forced to engage in an objective 
analysis of an officer’s good-faith reasonableness, a process that 
results in unfair deference to law enforcement at the expense of 
individual liberties.173 By requiring the use of biometric identifiers, 
the arresting officer could properly execute the warrant only if there 
was probable cause that the identifying information the biometric 
identifier revealed matched that of the arrestee. 
While the use of identifiers would greatly assist arresting 
officers in their determination of probable cause, it would not 
completely eliminate the possibility of wrongful incarceration. There 
will inevitably be incidents where the officer errs in comparing the 
 172. Hennigan, supra note 162. 
 173. Schoenfeld, supra note 42, at 1250–51. 
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information, sufficient similarity exists to support a finding of 
probable cause, or the charge is one of such a serious nature that 
minor discrepancies will not justify the individual’s release. 
However, in these situations, the innocent individual would still be 
released immediately after he or she is booked, as a fingerprint 
comparison through IAFIS would either pull up a different biometric 
identification number than the one listed on the warrant or generate a 
new identifier for the individual.174 No longer would individuals such 
as Rivera and Smith be subject to prolonged detention, since the 
actual subject’s biometric identifier would be immediately accessible 
and subject to comparison. 
V. CONCLUSION
In a country with an ever-increasing population, the arrest 
warrant particularity standard set down 119 years ago in West v. 
Cabell simply does not accurately account for the number of 
individuals an arrest warrant can currently describe.175 Court 
enforcement only compounds this problem. If an arrest warrant 
satisfies West, courts frequently defer to the discretion of law 
enforcement and presume that the arresting officer had probable 
cause to execute the warrant in light of its apparent validity.176 Given 
the current lack of recourse and difficult standards of proof by which 
mistaken identity victims must make a civil rights violation, the most 
reasonable solution is a revision of the particularity standard set 
down in West. While it may have been reasonable to think that a 
name or physical description could singularly identify the subject of 
an arrest warrant in 1894, it is no longer a reasonable interpretation 
of the Fourth Amendment’s warrant particularity requirement when 
considering the exponential increase in total population and the 
growing number of wrongful incarcerations. 
Given the infallible nature of fingerprinting for purposes of 
personal identification,177 and nationwide access to IAFIS,178
requiring officers and magistrates to issue arrest warrants with 
 174. See Smith, No. CV 11-10666, slip. op. at 2. 
 175. See Faturechi & Leonard, supra note 6. 
 176. See supra Part III.A. 
 177. Biometric Authentication: What Method Works Best?, supra note 10. 
 178. Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System, supra note 148. 
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biometric identifiers would greatly minimize future unlawful arrests, 
and at a minimal burden to law enforcement agencies. As such, the 
Supreme Court should acknowledge this out-of-date standard and 
revise the level of specificity for describing a subject of an arrest 
warrant to include biometric identifiers, thus reaffirming people’s 
enumerated right to be secure in their person and free from wrongful 
incarceration. 
